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The Intelsat Arbitration Agreement-
A Pattern for the Future?t
In 1962 Congress enacted the Communications Satellite Act as
the first step toward establishment of a worldwide commercial
communications satellite system.' That system became an opera-
tional reality in June 1965. The Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion, or Comsat, was organized under the 1962 Act and is the United
States participant in the International Telecommunications Satellite
Consortium, commonly known as Intelsat, which owns the system.
Comsat also acts as manager for the consortium.
Comsat is a corporation not quite like any other, though in many
ways it is trying to become as much like other corporations as
possible. The principal difference is that in addition to its normal
business functions, it is the chosen agent of the United States to
participate in a single global communications satellite system. 2 This
infusion of private business into what are customarily inter-govern-
mental negotiations has already had some interesting results. One of
its more noteworthy contributions has been the Intelsat Arbitration
Agreement. Some understanding of the factors that led to the
creation of Comsat and Intelsat will be useful to an appraisal of the
significant features of this agreement.
I. Creation of Comsat and Intelsat
The original bill to create the special corporation that is now
Comsat was drafted in the Office of Legal Counsel while Nicholas
* Member of the Texas Bar; former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice. The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Dudley
Chapman for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
t This article is adapted from a speech the author delivered to the American Bar
Association at its annual meeting in August, 1968.
1 76 Stat. 419 (Aug. 31, 1962), 47 U.S.C. 701 et seq. See Sen. Rep. No. 1584, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Commerce Committee) and H. Rep. 1636, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
2 See Throop, Some Legal Facets of Satellite Communications, 17 AM. UNIV., L. REV.
12 (1967).
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Katzenbach was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office.
Since then the office has had a continuing interest in the significant
legal problems arising under that legislation and the ensuing interna-
tional agreements. It has no connection with the management or
operation of Comsat itself, however, because the basic function of
the office is inside government. The office assists the Attorney
General in his role as legal adviser to the White House and the
Executive branch, particularly in connection with executive orders,
the Administration's legislative program, and questions of legality,
statutory interpretation and constitutionality. The Executive branch
has a continuing role in connection with several aspects of the
satellite communications programs.
The Comsat Act embodies the Congressional compromise re-
solving numerous conflicting views and policy goals raised by the
decision to go ahead with a commercial communications satellite
system. The resulting legislation is hardly a prototype of clarity. This
is not a criticism; it is an acknowledgment of the inevitable. The law
was at least enacted, and so far it has managed to get the job done.
The basic controversy over whether the system should be
publicly or privately owned was resolved in favor of private owner-
ship. At the same time, it was desired to make the benefits of this
technological advance, developed at great public expense, available
to the broadest possible public participation. It was also expected that
the high cost and large capacity of the system, as well as the
limitations of the radio frequency spectrum, would make competing
satellite systems impractical. Since the purpose of the system was to
provide international communications, it was clear that the coopera-
tion of other countries would be essential.
These considerations resulted in a decision to set up a private
corporation under the District of Columbia Corporation Code. The
stock ownership was to be evenly divided between communications
common carriers and the public. The fifteen-man board included six
directors representing the public and six representing the common
carrier shareholders, all chosen by cumulative voting, as well as three
directors appointed by the President. 3 Control over international
negotiations was reserved to the Department of State.4 A further
check on the corporation's policies was provided by authorizing the
3 47 U.S.C. 733(a).
4 47 U.S.C. 742.
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Attorney General to enforce all provisions of the 1962 Act through
court injunction. 5
The creation of Comsat was the first step in the creation of an
international system, but the shape of that system could not be
dictated by the United States. The Act recognized this by authorizing
Comsat to own and operate the system either itself or in cooperation
with foreign governments or business entities. 6
The corporation's role as an international negotiator assumed
full proportion in 1964. Both Comsat and the Department of State
participated in negotiating the 1964 executive agreement that created
Intelsat. In view of the novelty of the experiment, the agreement was
designed to be temporary and called for definitive arrangements to be
negotiated in 1969 and take effect in January, 1970. 7
Intelsat is a joint venture of both government and business
entities which jointly own the satellite portion of the international
system. Ground stations are something else again. The Intelsat
agreement, like our domestic legislation, separated the thorny ques-
tion of ground station ownership from that of the satellites.8
The executive organ of Intelsat is the Interim Communications
Satellite Committee. Voting rights in the Committee are based on the
relative investment quotas of the members. These quotas were a
central issue in the negotiations, and were resolved on the basis of
what was deemed a fair estimate of the prospective traffic attributable
to each participant. Comsat owns the United States share, which
amounts to a little more than 50% of the total, and has been
designated as manager of the entire system for the term of the interim
agreements. Comsat's vote is essential, but not sufficient by itself, to
authorize Committee action.9
The intergovernmental agreement which set up the consortium
was only one of three international agreements that govern Intelsat,
and it is the only one to which the U.S. Government is a signatory.
This is the basic "Intelsat Agreement." The Special Agreement,10
which was concluded simultaneously, is an operating agreement
5 47 U.S.C. 743(a).
6 47 U.S.C. 735(a)(1).
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat), August 20, 1964,
TIAS 5646. Art. IX.
8 47 U.S.C. 702(1), (2), (4); Intelsat Agreement, Art. I; see generally, Colino, Intelsat:
Doing Business in Outer Space 6 COL. J. TRANS. L. 17 (1967).
9 Intelsat Agreement, Art. V.
10 TIAS 5646.
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between the various entities, both public and private, which actually
participate in the system. Only Comsat signed this agreement, which
it also negotiated, on behalf of the United States.
The arbitration agreement, for which Comsat was also the U.S.
negotiator and signatory, was concluded several months after the
Intelsat and Special Agreements." Article 14 of the Special Agree-
ment specifically called for arrangements to be made for the submis-
sion of legal disputes to the decision of an impartial tribunal which
would decide such questions "in accordance with generally accepted
principles of law."
II. The Intelsat Arbitration Agreement
The Intelsat Arbitration Agreement implements this under-
standing by providing for the establishment of ad hoc tripartite
tribunals. In this respect it is unexceptional. The agreement, however,
departs from previous comparable agreements in three respects:
(1) It establishes an outside tribunal which can review the
legality of the Interim Committee's actions or failure to act;
(2) It contains an unusual provision for the appointment of the
impartial arbitrator; and
(3) The arbitral procedure is set forth in clear and specific detail
to an extent rare in agreements of this type.
The writer would like first to summarize these features of the
agreement and then add a few comments about their possible
relevance to other international agreements.
L Possible Legal Review of the Committee's Actions.
Earlier international agreements involving organizations such as
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the International
Finance Corporation, vested final decision-making authority in their
respective executive bodies. 12 The only circumstances in which
resort to an outside tribunal was permitted involved former parties to
the agreements or occasions when the organizations themselves are
not functioning. This follows logically from the fact that the execu-
11 The agreement was opened for signature on June 4, 1965 and entered into force Nov.
21, 1966, 50 Dept. of State Bull. 906 (1966).
12 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Art. 9; the International Monetary Fund, Art. 18; International Finance Corporation, Art
8; collected in 2 PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1961).
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tive organs, which have the technical expertise essential to a mean-
ingful understanding of their needs, are the decision-making bodies of
these organizations.
Intelsat, like these organizations, manages substantial capital
assets, and voting control is proportionate to investment. It is perhaps
even more dependent on technical expertise than the older, financial
institutions. In view of the relatively experimental character of the
Intelsat arrangements, however, it was agreed that there should be
some effective means of assuring that the governing committee could
be forced to comply with the terms of the basic agreements.13
One of the issues considered during the negotiations was
whether there should be a continuing tribunal with the power to give
advisory opinions. It was concluded that this might pose a threat to
the effective management of the consortium by the governing com-
mittee called for in the Intelsat and Special Agreements. As further
assurance that the operating effectiveness of the Committee would
not be unduly affected, the Agreement provides that the Committee,
if it is to be bound by a decision declaring one of its actions invalid,
must be a party to the proceeding. 14
The real achievement of the drafters of the arbitration agreement
consists in reconciling the need for an impartial ad hoc tribunal, in
which a high degree of technical expertise can be assured, with the
need for some control by the Interim Committee in the selection of
the impartial arbitrator.
2. Selection of the Impartial Arbitrator.
The major difference between the Intelsat procedure and the
traditional means of selecting the umpire is that the governing
committee may in effect veto any person who might fill that role, but
is committed in advance to agree that any of seven persons may
become a deciding arbiter. This commitment is itself balanced by the
relatively short two-year term for which experts are appointed,
though renomination is permitted. 15
The agreement calls for each party to name one arbitrator-who
need not be on any approved list-and for the two arbitrators thus
13 Throop, note 2, supra at 19.
14 Arbitration Agreement, Art. 11 (c). The Arbitration Agreement is bound together with
the Intelsat and Special Agreements in a pamphlet edition of TIAS 5646, but does not appear in
the TIAS series.
15 Art. 3.
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chosen to agree on a third, as is typical of such agreements. However,
the two arbitrators are required to choose the third from a preselected
group. If they cannot agree or if the party respondent fails to
designate its own arbitrator, there is a relatively unusual procedure
for making these selections.
In brief, each signatory to the agreement is required to designate
one legal expert who will be available to serve as the president of
arbitral tribunals for a period of two years. From this group the
Intelsat Committee chooses a panel of seven, which are supposed to
represent the major legal systems represented among the signatories.
The panel elects one of its own members to act as chairman. 17 If the
two party-appointed arbitrators to an ad hoc tribunal cannot agree on
a third member to be chosen from this panel, the chairman is required
to appoint a panel member other than himself. If the respondent party
fails to appoint its own arbitrator, the chairman of the panel appoints
one from among the larger group of experts from which the panel
itself has been chosen. 18 The use of the word "panel" follows the
usage of the Agreement, in using it to refer to a group of preselected
arbitrators, and not to the arbitral tribunals themselves. The present
panel consists of the experts appointed from Brazil, Norway, the
United States, Australia, Spain, Malaysia and Japan. The chairman is
Jens Evenson of Norway.
This procedure differs considerably from the more typical provi-
sion for selecting an umpire when the parties cannot agree, which is
to leave the selection to some official such as the President of the
International Court of Justice. Under such a provision the person
finally appointed is not subject to prior approval by either party.
Here, the Intelsat Committee has approved the entire panel. Impar-
tiality is nevertheless promoted by: (1) appointment by the individual
signatories of the group from which the committee must select the
panel; (2) the requirement that the panel be representative of the
major legal systems, which protects against packing the panel with
representatives of any one point of view; (3) the panel's appointment
of its own chairman from within its ranks; and (4) the fact that this
much of the selection procedure takes place before any dispute
arises.
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Permanent Court of Arbitration' 9 of 1899 and the World Bank's
Centre for the Settlement of International Investment disputes of
196520 employ preselected groups of arbitrators from which an
umpire is ultimately chosen. In both cases, however, the panel
members from whom the final choice is made consist of the relatively
large group including the nominees of all parties. The World Bank's
Investment Dispute Centre, for example, presently has 84 persons in
its standing panel.
The unique feature of the Intelsat arrangement thus lies in the
advance selection of a very small panel from among the larger group
appointed by all signatories to the agreement. This gives the parties a
fairly good idea in advance of what they are getting.
3. Detailed Procedure for Arbitration
The third principal feature of the Intelsat arbitration agreement
is the degree of procedural detail that it includes. These provisions
were designed to make the arbitration as simple, expeditious and
inexpensive as possible.
The agreement applies to all legal disputes as to whether an
action or failure to act by the Interim Committee or any signatory is
proper under the Intelsat agreements or any related agreement. 21
An arbitration proceeding is commenced by the simple filing of
what is blandly called a "document," setting forth the grounds of
complaint and designating an arbitrator to represent the complaining
party. The party complained against is not required to file an
answering document, but must designate its own arbitrator within 21
days. If it fails to do so, an arbitrator is appointed on its behalf in the
manner described above within ten days after a request by the
applicant's side. 22
Times and places of sittings are left to the tribunal. Proceedings
are held in private, and material presented to the tribunal is to be
treated as confidential.2 3 This latter provision is of great potential
importance in view of the "discovery" provision which requires that
parties "shall provide all information determined by the Tribunal
11 2 PEASLEE, note 12, supra at 1700.
20 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and Nationals
of other states, March 18, 1965.
21 Art. 2(a), (b).
22 Art. 4.
23 Art. 5.
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.. to be required for the proper handling and determination of the
dispute. 24
The practical businessman's understandable concern with hold-
ing down the cost of litigation is reflected in the attempt to discourage
oral hearings-which are permitted only if "the tribunal considers it
appropriate. ' 25 Provision is also made for the equivalent of dis-
covery,2 6 counterclaim, 27 default judgments,2 8 intervention29 and
interim measures. 30 The applicable law is stated to be the Intelsat
Agreement and the Special Agreement, interpreted "in accordance
with generally accepted principles of law" 31-a standard that sounds
reminiscent of those well-known "generally accepted accounting
practices."
Deliberations of the tribunal are secret, but decisions must be
supported by a written opinion. Dissenting opinions are expressly
permitted. 32 Decisions are binding on the parties to the dispute and
are to be carried out by them in good faith.3 3 There is, however, no
provision for injunction.
There is one respect in which the procedures could have been
more complete: the question of disputes over the interpretation of the
award itself. The simple answer would appear to be that such
interpretations should be given by the tribunal itself. However, the
detailed provisions of the agreement leave room for several poten-
tially awkward questions that are not likely to solve themselves. Is
there, for example, any time limit on when the tribunal can be
reconvened? Can the chairman oblige the old tribunal to reconvene?
Does it make any difference if the two-year term of a panel member
has expired? Does the same tribunal have continuing jurisdiction, or
is a question of interpretation of an award an independent dispute as
to which the entire arbitration proceeding, including the formation of
a new tribunal, is available? Is the chairman of the panel obliged to
appoint a new (or the old) president and a substitute arbitrator for a








31 Art. 1 (a).
32 Art. 5.
33 Art. I I (c).
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is he to be replaced according to the procedure for this contingency
prior to award?3 4 Must a new tribunal be chosen? Some clarification
of these points would be desirable if the agreement is reviewed in
connection with the negotiations for the definitive Intelsat arrange-
ments to be conducted in 1969. 3 5
III. Pattern for the Future?
How has it all worked? Any analysis of the Intelsat arbitration
agreement at this time suffers from one unavoidable shortcoming: No
arbitrations have yet been completed or initiated-which certainly
doesn't bother Comsat, or me. An appraisal of the Agreement may
nevertheless be worthwhile, because some of its provisions may
provide useful precedents in the evolving pattern of international
agreements.
There is already one situation in which the approach used by the
drafters of the Intelsat arbitration agreement may prove useful even
though its specific provisions may not be appropriate.
Last spring the writer had the privilege of serving briefly as a
member of the U.S. Delegation to a United Nations Conference on
the Law of Treaties which was held in Vienna. Starting from a draft
prepared by the International Law Commission, the representatives
of more than 100 nations hammered out a proposed convention
covering the entire range of treaty law, including the conclusion,
application, interpretation, validity and termination of treaties. This
convention will be submitted to the U.N. member for final action at
the second and final session of the conference held in Vienna in
April-May, 1969.
If the convention is adopted, international law will be changed in
several important respects. For the first time an authoritative interna-
tional convention will sanction a broad range of legal bases on which
a party to a treaty may purport to terminate or assert the invalidity of
the treaty. Part V of the proposed convention expressly authorizes
such grounds for avoidance or termination as that a party's consent
34 Art. 4(f) provides for filling a vacancy on the part of the president in accordance with
the initial procedures. Party designated arbitrators may be replaced by the party which chose
the arbitrator whose seat becomes vacant. Id. If no substitution is made, the remaining members
are empowered to continue, Art. 4(g), (h). Presumably, the president alone could continue if
both parties leave vacancies unfilled.
35 See generally Washburn, Arbitration Procedures forIntelsat's Legal Disputes, 23 ARB.
J. 97 (1968).
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was obtained by fraud or corruption, coercion of its representative,
or the threat or use of force; that the treaty is no longer valid because
of a "fundamental change of circumstances" (rebus sic stantibus); or
that it is void because it conflicts with a previous or newly developed
fundamental international norm from which no derogation is permit-
ted-the relatively new and controversial doctrine of ius cogens.
The United States delegation was concerned that regardless of
the substantive merits of these provisions, their phrasing is so general
that they might be open to serious abuse by countries unjustifiably
seeking to escape their treaty obligations unilaterally. Our proposed
amendments seeking to make these provisions more precise were
almost uniformly rejected. The general stability of treaty relation-
ships could well be undermined unless the convention provides for
mandatory third party settlement procedures where claims of in-
validity can be objectively evaluated. Our concern was shared by a
great many other countries, but there was not nearly enough concen-
sus to permit the shaping of such procedures. Consequently, final
action was deferred until next year's session, with the approved text
simply providing that disputing parties shall seek a peaceful solution
under Article 33 of the U.N. charter 36 as suggested in the Interna-
tional Law Commission's text.
It is not suggested that the Intelsat Arbitration Agreement will
resolve this thorny dilemma. The Intelsat provisions were designed to
meet a much more defined category of problems than the proposed
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In both approach and substance,
however, it has aspects which may prove useful in the context of
intergovernmental treaty disputes as well as international business
disputes.
In terms of approach, one of the most interesting things about
the Intelsat provisions is that the businessmen who were going to
have to live with it did not accept a skeletal arrangement of the kind
so typically concluded between governments. The provision for the
selection of Intelsat arbitrators represents a careful compromise
between interests which knew that they would be bound by the
proceedings of the ad hoc tribunals. The detailed procedural provi-
36 "Art. 33. 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
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sions serve to narrow the number of problems that have to be
resolved after a dispute arises.
Substantively, the use of a preselected panel-not just the
appointment of a large group of prospective arbitrators, but the
advance selection of a smaller panel from among such a group-has a
great potential. The choice of a chairman by the panel itself and of the
third arbitrator by the chairman could provide an interesting alterna-
tive to selection of the third arbitrator by the U.N. Secretary General
or the President of the International Court of Justice.
A panel of this kind can provide much greater flexibility than a
standing court or other tribunal. Different panels, for example, could
be tailored to deal with different areas of jurisdiction requiring
different expertise. This is true whether we are dealing with disputes
between business or governments-and as Comsat and Intelsat
illustrate, that difference can sometimes be a pretty fine line.
As hard as it may be for lawyers to admit, binding third party
resolution of important international business or government dis-
putes may prove more acceptable if some of the arbitrators are
selected for other than legal qualifications. Effective settlement may
require participation of statesmen of recognized international stature,
or technical experts who may not be lawyers at all.
The need to develop conciliation and arbitration procedures
adapted to the settlement of critical international disputes-in which
questions of law are typically mixed with other considerations which
can be much more important-is clearly one of the major challenges
facing us today. If this challenge is to be met successfully, it will be
through adapting old and shaping new techniques for arbitration and
selecting arbitrators, creatively and resourcefully, as the parties did
in negotiating the Intelsat arbitration agreement. In this sense, that
agreement may well provide a pattern for the future in areas even
more crucial than the one with which it deals.
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